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The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
360 Russell Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

O/CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

OCA 87 5670

OCA FILE ① Leg. ② Sen. Specter
③ Media

Dear Senator Specter:

Washington Post staff writer, Walter Pincus, reports and describes generally in today's edition several legislative reforms for the Central Intelligence Agency which you introduced on 27 October. Among these, one in particular has drawn my particular attention and concern; namely, "...splitting the director of central intelligence job into two parts: a director of national intelligence to be the president's primary adviser on foreign intelligence, supervise all U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies, and serve on the National Security Council; and a director of the central intelligence agency to manage the agency and carry out covert action."

I urge you to **reconsider** this part of your legislative proposal. Such a move, while possible, is neither practical nor wise. This is especially so at a time when public interest and Congressional anxieties "...stemming from the Iran-contra scandal..." have generated sharper focus on the continuing need for quality leadership of the U.S. intelligence community, improved accountability by the intelligence establishment, and most importantly the growing necessity for less bureaucratic and more dynamic response to the ever-widening array of national security concerns to be addressed by intelligence.

In a very real sense, your proposal—if passed—will almost certainly accomplish less than more. It will simply add 'layering', compound diffusion of intelligence responsibility in difficult times of national crisis or intelligence wrongdoing, and introduce yet another flag to be saluted in an already cumbersome intelligence bureaucracy.

The idea of a Director of National Intelligence is more novel than new—an argument that has surfaced with the arrival of each new White House administration for more than a dozen years. Persistently, the arguments have come to no avail because, in the main, such a change in the role of the DCI is seen as one of 'cosmetic' appeal pressed by those who wish to appease (or thwart) public misperceptions, and as a step backward by those who are charged with intelligence productivity at the national level.

I ask that you consider the following:

- Your proposal would likely require yet another amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 in order to properly establish, legitimize and define specifically the separate and distinct roles to be set for a DNI and a D/CIA.

Relatedly, amendment to the Act may be necessary regarding the role and mission of the CIA. Moreover, such legislation begs the question—will the the DNI become a full-fledged member of the Cabinet, or simply accorded Cabinet rank as in the case of former Director Casey? Lastly in this regard, a serious question is raised on the matter of legislative responsibility and intent versus executive branch prerogative.

- It is almost impossible to imagine how a Director of National Intelligence who would be a Presidential appointee (likely to change with administrations) could bring greater objectivity into the intelligence leadership milieu. Also, its equally difficult to imagine how this same individual could be or become more knowledgeable on matters of foreign intelligence than the head of the CIA—an individual whose current role and responsibilities involve him deeply and daily in operational activities that are global in scale and national in scope. How would your legislative proposal reconcile not only the roles of two senior intelligence leaders but also that of the Assistant to the President for national security affairs?
- It is worth pointing up as well the fact that currently and in consonance with the Act of '47, the DCI not only bears overall responsibility for the production of national intelligence, but has, by executive order and collegial skill, become day-to-day-manager of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The NFIP involves not only DCI shepharding of substantive intelligence objectives, but the delicate shaping and allocations of intelligence dollar and manpower resources, most of which are the properties of several U.S. departments and agencies. The potential for conflict and folly at the National Security Council level rises importantly with the appointment of a super intelligence chief—a DNI.

These are but a few of several key concerns which rush to mind in reading of your legislative proposal, at least as it has been broadly described.

As a recently retired intelligence officer, an adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College where I teach a graduate course on the national intelligence management system, and member of the American Intelligence Journal's editorial board, I would be pleased, at your behest, to delve further into the merits and de-merits of this part of your legislative proposal.

Respectfully,

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